TTAB Statutory Cause of Action (previously known as Standing) for Oppositions and Cancellations Likelihood of Confusion is one of the most common reasons for oppositions or cancellations with the TTAB (Trademark Trial and Appeal Board). Note that a petition to cancel claiming a likelihood of confusion for a complete cancellation is not available for a mark that has been registered on the Principal Register for more than 5 years and has become incontestable. However, under Trademark Act §18, 15 USC §1068, a petitioner may seek to partially cancel a registration over 5 years old by restricting the goods or services therein in order to avoid a likelihood of confusion. Other grounds that are not available for a petition to cancel a mark that has been registered on the Principal Register for more than 5 years and has become an incontestable trademark are likelihood to cause mistake, or to deceive; being merely descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, primarily geographically descriptive, primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive; that defendant's mark is primarily merely a surname; that there was no bona fide use of defendant's mark in commerce prior to the filing of the use- How common are oppositions or cancellations? About 30% of Extensions of Time to Oppose result in Oppositions. |
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How To Show Statutory Cause of Action (previously known as Standing) For A Trademark Opposition or Cancellation (extracted from TBMP 309.03(b) June 2022) A real interest in the proceeding and a reasonable belief of damage may be found, for example, where plaintiff pleads (and later proves): Cause of Action Claim Case references |
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A claim of likelihood of confusion that is not wholly without merit [ Note 11.], including claims based upon current ownership of a valid and subsisting registration [ Note 12.] or prior use of a confusingly similar mark. [ Note 13.] A registration on the Supplemental Register may be sufficient to establish an entitlement to a statutory cause of action [ Note 14.]; |
11. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Selva & Sons, Inc. v. Nina Footwear, Inc., 705 F.2d 1316, 217 USPQ 641, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Lipton Industries Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982); Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 209 USPQ 40, 44 (CCPA 1981) (plaintiff may show standing based on common law rights in mark that is distinctive, inherently or otherwise); Bausch & Lomb Incorporated v. Karl Storz GmbH & Co KG, 87 USPQ2d 1526, 1530 (TTAB 2008) (standing established by introduction of parties’ agreement); L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, 86 USPQ2d 1883, 1887 (TTAB 2008) (standing established by properly making pleaded registrations of record); Herbaceuticals Inc. v. Xel Herbaceuticals Inc., 86 USPQ2d 1572, 1576 (TTAB 2008) (standing based on ownership of prior registration not voided by allegation, even if true, that mark is generic); Grand Canyon West Ranch LLC v. Hualapai Tribe, 88 USPQ2d 1501, 1502 (TTAB 2008) (standing established by testimony as to prior use); Schering- 12. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982); King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974) (prior registration but not priority in use); Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Development, 2019 USPQ2d 377409, at *4 (TTAB 2019) (pleaded registration made of record); Primrose Retirement Communities, LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC, 122 USPQ2d 1030, 1032 (TTAB 2016) (same); Research in Motion Limited v. Defining Presence Marketing Group Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1187, 1190 (TTAB 2012) (same); Vital Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Kronholm, 99 USPQ2d 1708, 1712 (TTAB 2011) (standing established because pleaded registrations are of record on a motion for involuntary dismissal); Rocket Trademarks Pty. Ltd. v. Phard S.p.A., 98 USPQ2d 1066, 1072 (TTAB 2011) (pleaded registrations of record); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Omnisource DDS LLS, 97 USPQ2d 1300, 1301 (TTAB 2010) (same); Brown Shoe Co. v. Robbins, 90 USPQ2d 1752, 1754 (TTAB 2009) (same); Bass Pro Trademarks LLC v. Sportsman’s Warehouse Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1844, 1849 (TTAB 2008) (same); Corporacion Habanos S.A. v. Anncas Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1785, 1790 (TTAB 2008) (same); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club LP v. Sherman, 88 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2008) (standing established by making of record copies of its pleaded registrations showing the current status of the registrations and their ownership in opposer); H.D. Lee Co. v. Maidenform Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1715, 1721 (TTAB 2008) (opposer alleged ownership of application that issued during proceeding and introduced a certified copy of subsequent registration at trial showing current status and title in opposer’s name); Apple Computer v. TVNET.net Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1393, 1396 (TTAB 2007) (pleaded registrations made of record); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Kendrick, 85 USPQ2d 1032, 1037 n.10 (TTAB 2007) (opposer’s allegations of ownership of pleaded registrations insufficient to prove standing); Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson Electric Co., 84 USPQ2d 1482, 1490 (TTAB 2007) (pleaded registrations made of record; cancelled registration has no probative value); Christian Broadcasting Network Inc. v. ABS- 13. See First Niagara Insurance Brokers Inc. v. First Niagara Financial Group Inc., 476 F.3d 867, 81 USPQ2d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (intrastate use by foreign opposer); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Mark Thomann, 2020 USPQ2d 53785, at *11 (TTAB 2020) (opposer’s standing confirmed by proof of its corporate relationship to entity using the mark as part of its trade name); Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Development, 2019 USPQ2d 377409, at *4 (TTAB 2019) (standing also established by testimony with exhibits of earlier use of confusingly similar mark); Ayoub, Inc. v. ACS Ayoub Carpet Service, 118 USPQ2d 1392, 1395 (TTAB 2016) (opposer’s trade name use; admissions by applicant that opposer is direct competitor); Hunt Control Systems Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., 98 USPQ2d 1558, 1565 (TTAB 2011) (prior use established by testimony and conceded by applicant); Syngenta Crop Protection Inc. v. Bio- 14. See Otter Products LLC v. BaseOneLabs LLC, 105 USPQ2d 1252, 1254 (TTAB 2012) (opposer’s Supplemental Registration sufficient to establish opposer’s real interest in proceeding). |
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Plaintiff has been refused registration of its mark because of defendant’s registration, or has been advised that it will be refused registration when defendant’s application matures into a registration, or has a reasonable belief that registration of its application will be refused because of defendant’s registration [ Note 15.]; |
15. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (plaintiff’s application refused based on defendant’s registrations); Hole In 1 Drinks, Inc. v. Lajtay, 2020 USPQ2d 10020, at *3 (TTAB 2020) (evidence of record showing petitioner’s pending application refused registration based on respondent’s registration); Performance Products Ltd. v. Weapon X Motorsports, Inc., 126 USPQ2d 1034, 1039- |
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Plaintiff has a bona fide intent to use the same mark for related goods, and is about to file an intent- |
16. See American Vitamin Products Inc. v. Dow Brands Inc., 22 USPQ2d 1313, 1314 (TTAB 1992). |
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Defendant has relied on its ownership of its application or registration in another proceeding between the parties, or defendant has asserted a likelihood of confusion in another proceeding between the parties involving the same marks. [ Note 17.] |
17. See Tonka Corp. v. Tonka Tools, Inc., 229 USPQ 857, 859 (TTAB 1986) (petitioner has standing to cancel registration that has been asserted, even defensively, in a civil action); and M. Aron Corp. v. Remington Products, Inc., 222 USPQ 93, 96 (TTAB 1984). |
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A counterclaimant’s entitlement to a statutory cause of action to cancel a pleaded registration is inherent in its position as defendant in the original proceeding. [ Note 18.] See also TBMP § 313.03. |
18. See Harry Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., 111 USPQ2d 1419, 1428 (TTAB 2014) ("Applicant has standing based on opposers’ assertion of their marks and registrations against applicant in their notice of opposition."); Delaware Quarries, Inc. v. PlayCore IP Sub, Inc., 108 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (TTAB 2013) (standing assessed at time the counterclaim is filed and Board’s dismissal of the main claim does not render counterclaim moot); Finanz St. Honore B.V. v. Johnson & Johnson, 85 USPQ2d 1478, 1479 (TTAB 2007); Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1492, 1502 (TTAB 2005); Ohio State University v. Ohio University, 51 USPQ2d 1289, 1293 (TTAB 1999); Ceccato v. Manifattura Lane Gaetano Marzotto & Figli S.p.A., 32 USPQ2d 1192, 1195 n.7 (TTAB 1994); Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc., 14 USPQ2d 1879, 1881 (TTAB 1990); Bankamerica Corp. v. Invest America, 5 USPQ2d 1076, 1078 (TTAB 1987); General Mills, Inc. v. Nature’s Way Products, 202 USPQ 840, 841 (TTAB 1979) (counterclaimant’s position as defendant in the opposition gives him a personal stake in the controversy). Cf. Great Seats Ltd. v. Great Seats Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1235, 1236 n.3 (TTAB 2007) (respondent in a cancellation proceeding has standing by virtue of its ownership of involved registration). |
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A plaintiff need not assert proprietary rights in a term in order to have an entitlement to a statutory cause of action. [ Note 19.] For example, when descriptiveness or genericness of the mark is in issue, plaintiff may plead (and later prove) its entitlement to a statutory cause of action by alleging that it is engaged in the sale of the same or related products or services (or that the product or service in question is within the normal expansion of plaintiff’s business) and that the plaintiff has an interest in using the term descriptively in its business. (That is, plaintiff may plead that it is a competitor.) [ Note 20.] Allegations that plaintiff is a competitor may be made in connection with other claims as well. [ Note 21.] |
19. See Piano Factory Group, Inc. v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH, 11 F.4th 1363, 2021 USPQ2d 913, at *10 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ("A party asserting a false association bar to registration under section 2(a) need not have proprietary rights to a name as long as the party has a reasonable belief that it will be or is being damaged by the false suggestion of a connection between a person and the challenged mark."); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837, at *3- 20. See Jewelers Vigilance Committee Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp.,823 F.2d 490, 2 USPQ2d 2021, 2024 (Fed. Cir. 1987), on remand, 5 USPQ2d 1622 (TTAB 1987), rev’d, 853 F.2d 888, 7 USPQ2d 1628 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 209 USPQ 40, 43 (CCPA 1981); Golomb v. Wadsworth, 592 F.2d 1184, 201 USPQ 200, 201 (CCPA 1979). University of Kentucky v. 40- Cf. Great Seats Ltd. v. Great Seats Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1235, 1244 n.10 (TTAB 2007) (defense of unclean hands, even if established, does not deprive petitioner of standing). 21. See, e.g., M/S R.M. Dhariwal (HUF) 100% EOU v. Zarda King Ltd., 2019 U.S.P.Q.2d 149090, at *4 (TTAB 2019) (standing to assert a § 2(c) claim may be established by facts that plaintiff is a competitor and has a present or prospective right to use the name). |
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If a plaintiff can show an entitlement to a statutory cause of action on one ground, it has the right to assert any other grounds in an opposition or cancellation proceeding. [ Note 22.] |
22. See Hole In 1 Drinks, Inc. v. Lajtay, 2020 USPQ2d 10020, at *3 (TTAB 2020) (once standing shown on one ground, plaintiff has right to assert any other ground in proceeding); Poly- |
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Have you been opposed, had a petition to cancel or had an extension of time to oppose filed against you? Email us at W@TMK.law or call us at 1-
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Examples of Likelihood of Confusion or Confusingly Similar Trademarks (TTAB) |
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Conflicting Marks |
Case reference |
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SUPER CHIRO TEA for "herbal teas for medicinal purposes" so resembled opposer's previously used mark CHIROKLENZ for a detoxifying herbal tea, as to be likely to cause confusion among purchasers. The Board found that applicant took "affirmative steps to cause confusion and to associate SUPER CHIRO TEA with CHIRO- |
Edom Laboratories, Inc. V. Lichter (TTAB 2012) |
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L'OREAL PARIS for "aloe vera drinks" so resembles opposer's previously used and/or registered L'OREAL and L'OREAL PARIS marks for a full range of cosmetics, skin care, and hair care products, some that include aloe vera as an ingredient, as well as for a variety of services, as to be likely to cause confusion. |
L'OREAL S.A. v. MARCON, (TTAB 2011) |
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GULPY, when used in connection with "portable animal water dishes and animal water containers sold empty" does not so resemble BIG GULP, GULP, or any of opposer's other "Gulp" marks as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. |
7- |
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OIL ZONE and WASH ZONE (junior marks) for oil change and car wash services are sufficiently similar to (senior user) AUTOZONE mark for retail auto parts sales:
Marks must be viewed in their entireties, and despite certain dissimilarities, prominent similarities between marks may lead consumers to believe that OIL ZONE and WASH ZONE were extensions of AUTO ZONE. |
AutoZone Inc. v. Strick, 88 USPQ2d 1225 (7th Cir. 2008) |
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“Girl Design” senior mark for U.S. parboiled rice sold in Saudi Arabia was infringed by “Girl with a Hat Design” used on bags of U.S. parboiled rice sold in Saudi Arabia, even though senior user’s design depicts visibly Asian girl, whereas junior user’s design incorporates scarf or hat on girl's head, since marks both depict young women with similar hair, dress, and features, posed behind rectangular shape, holding bowl of rice, and utilize same red, yellow, and black color scheme. Findings: the Lanham Act requirements were met such that ARI's Girl Design was protectable because the image of a girl icon being used to sell rice is not intrinsic to rice as a product |
American Rice Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill Inc., 86 USPQ2d 1162 (5th Cir. 2008). |
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In assessing likelihood of confusion marks at issue, marks must be compared in their entireties. CHI PLUS mark for electric massage apparatus is likely to cause consumer confusion with CHI design mark for legally identical goods, since word “Chi” is integral component of parties' marks, and addition of word “plus” to mark already established and in use for electric therapeutic massagers is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. In this case, other differences between parties' marks are unlikely to prevent confusion. |
China Healthways Institute Inc. v. Xiaoming Wang, 83 USPQ2d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2007). |
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Goods or Services Need Not Be Identical: ON- |
On- |
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Goods or Services Need Not Be Identical: MARTIN’S for wheat bran and honey bread held likely to be confused with MARTIN’S for cheese |
In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984) |
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Goods or Services Need Not Be Identical: ENYCE for custom automotive accessories held likely to be confused with ENYCE for various clothing items and accessories directed to the urban lifestyle market. |
L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman, 86 USPQ2d 1883 (TTAB 2008) |
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Goods or Services Need Not Be Identical: CONFIRM for a buffered solution equilibrated to yield predetermined dissolved gas values in a blood gas analyzer held likely to be confused with CONFIRMCELLS for diagnostic blood reagents for laboratory use |
In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) |
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Goods or Services Need Not Be Identical: LAREDO for land vehicles and structural parts therefor held likely to be confused with LAREDO for pneumatic tires |
In re Jeep Corp., 222 USPQ 333 (TTAB 1984) |
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Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance despite the addition, deletion, or substitution of letters or words: TMM held confusingly similar to TMS, both for systems software |
Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates, Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990) |
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Similarity in Sound – Phonetic Equivalents: Acknowledging that “there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark” and finding ISHINE (stylized) likely to be confused with ICE SHINE, both for floor- |
Centraz Industries Inc. v. Spartan Chemical Co. Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (TTAB 2006) |
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Similarity in Sound – Phonetic Equivalents: SEYCOS and design for watches held likely to be confused with SEIKO for watches and clocks |
Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Tokeiten v. Scuotto, 228 USPQ 461 (TTAB 1985) |
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Similarity in Sound – Phonetic Equivalents: CAYNA (stylized) for soft drinks held likely to be confused with CANA for, inter alia, canned and frozen fruit and vegetable juices |
In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 USPQ 483 (TTAB 1985) |
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Similarity in Sound – Phonetic Equivalents: ENTELEC and design for association services in the telecommunication and energy industries held likely to be confused with INTELECT for conducting expositions for the electrical industry |
In re Energy Telecommunications & Electrical Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350 (TTAB 1983) |
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Similarity in Sound – Phonetic Equivalents: CRESCO and design for leather jackets held likely to be confused with KRESSCO for hosiery |
In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963) |
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Similarity in Meaning: CITY WOMAN held likely to be confused with CITY GIRL, both for clothing |
In re M. Serman & Co., Inc., 223 USPQ 52 (TTAB 1984) |
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Similarity in Meaning: GAS CITY (“GAS” disclaimed) held likely to be confused with GASTOWN, both for gasoline |
Gastown Inc., of Delaware v. Gas City, Ltd., 187 USPQ 760 (TTAB 1975) |
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Similarity in Meaning: AQUA- |
Watercare Corp. v. Midwesco- |
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LAPP and LAPP CABLE identical for all practical purposes (Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F. 2d 460 (3rd Cir. 1983)) Similarity between the marks SIDE DISH and BANQUET SIDE DISH FOR ONE is obvious (Tree Tavern Products, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 640 F.Supp. 1263, 1270 (D.Del.1986)) Where dominant portions of two marks, COUNTRY FLOORS and COUNTRY TILES are the same, confusion is likely(Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.1991) ) |
As cited in Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F. 3d 466 - |
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